Attorney\u27s Liabilities under ERISA by Campbell, David L.
Volume 82 Issue 1 Article 9 
September 1979 
Attorney's Liabilities under ERISA 
David L. Campbell 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Legal Profession Commons, and the Retirement Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David L. Campbell, Attorney's Liabilities under ERISA, 82 W. Va. L. Rev. (1979). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss1/9 
This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
ATTORNEY'S LIABILITIES UNDER ERISA
The proliferation of private pension plans' in America is a
relatively modern phenomenon, primarily attributable to eco-
nomic changes in this country since World War ]I[2 By way of
I A private pension plan is one established by an employer, a group of employ-
ers (commonly referred to as a multi-employer plan) or a union or other group of
employees. Use of the term private pension plan does not contemplate the inclusion
of governmental or military pension plans. The private pension plans will be collec-
tively referred to as the private pension system.
2 A discussion of the factors influencing the growth of pension plans appears
in the ALI-ABA TAXATION PRACTcE HANDBOOK:
The first known private pension plan in the United States was
started in 1875 by the American Express Company. In the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries few plans were set up, and of these many
were informal and loose arrangements. Most of the early plans were es-
tablished by large corporations, and participation was often limited to
the office or white-collar workers. By 1925 only about four hundred pen-
sion plans were in operation; these covered four million workers, a third
of whom were employed by four giant corporations-U.S. Steel Corpora-
tion, the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads, and the Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Company. Most unions considered pen-
sions paternalistic and had no interest in them, although a few, such as
the International Typographical Union in 1908, did start their own pen-
sion plans financed out of membership dues. In general, however, there
was little interest in pension plans.
The situation changed dramatically in the 1930's and 1940's. As
shown during the Depression, the average man in a modem industrialized
economy is unable to make dependable arrangements for his own security
if he is limited to his individual means. The growth of urban living and
urban employment tends to put older people on their own in making
living arrangements and at the same time restricts their chances for
earning a livelihood. It was once usual for several generations to live
under one roof-today, urbanization has fragmented the family unit.
Passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 established a minimum
pension base on which employers could build a private plan. During
World War II, the freeze on wages and salaries increased the growth of
fringe benefits, including pensions and health and welfare plans, which
were exempt from the freeze. Since wartime personal and corporate in-
come tax rates were extremely high and the costs of pension and welfare
plans were tax-deductible to the employer, these plans became an attrac-
tive means of competing for scarce employees.
During the postwar prosperity, organized labor reversed its attitude
of disinterest toward pension plans. In the Inland Steel case (1949), the
U.S. Supreme Court held that pensions are subject to collective bargain-
ing. Soon, management and union representatives negotiated pension
plans in the steel and auto industries, then in other mass-production
industries, and finally throughout American business.
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illustration, in 1940 an estimated four million employees were cov-
ered by private pension plans; by the early 1970's this number had
grown to over thirty million employees who comprised nearly half
of the private non-agricultural work force.3 This rapid growth rate
may be attributed to a sense of responsibility on the part of private
industry for the economic welfare of employees beyond their pro-
ductive years of service as well as an expression of dissatisfaction
on the part of employees with the inadequacies of governmental
retirement compensation.'
The vast accumulation of funds required to provide benefits
created under private plans has placed the private pension system
in a position to influence the fundamental components of our na-
tional economy. Yet, in spite of various Congressional attempts to
control the administration of such plans,' the private pension sys-
tem represented the largest private accumulation of substantially
D. RaOTHAN, ESTABLISHING & ADMINISTEiNG PENSION & PROFIT SHARIG PLANS &
TRusT FUNDs 1-2 (ALI-ABA TAxATiON PRACTICE HANDBOOK Series No. 20, 1967).
3 H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4641.
Id. at 4640.
It is estimated that employee pension funds control more than one-third of
the equity capital of America's public-owned companies, more than enough to give
them voting control. It is projected that by the mid-1980's the equity ownership
by pension funds will rise to 50% or more. Drucker, American Business's New
Owners, Wall St. J., May 27, 1976, at 22, col. 4.
1 In 1958, Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act to
protect plan participants and beneficiaries from the unauthorized use of pension
funds. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. §§
1001-1381 (1974)). Under this Act, plan administrators were required to make cer-
tain disclosures. The Act was amended in 1962 to make theft, embezzlement and
bribery or kickbacks involving pension funds or pension officials federal crimes.
Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 42 (1962) (repealed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-
1381 (1974)). Nonetheless, the legislation proved ineffective since the individual
participants were responsible for the policing aspects of plan administration. Pub.
L. No. 85-836, §§ 2-10, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. §§
1001-1381 (1974)). Regulations imposed by the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141-188 (1975), the Labor Management Reporting Disclo-
sure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-531 (1975), and the Internal Revenue Code,
I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a), and 501(a) provided few, if any, safeguards. Nonetheless,
in the absence of controlling federal statutes, plan participants were often forced
to resort to the various states' common law of trusts in order to enforce their
equitable rights to plan assets. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
164 (1959). Many of these equitable claims were then denied due to strict interpre-
tations of technical plan provisions by state courts. As more private pension plans
terminated and participating employees were denied the benefits upon which they
had been relying for retirement, pressure mounted for government intervention.
[Vol. 82
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unregulated funds in the country prior to the enactment of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) .
ERISA represents the latest attempt by Congress to provide
an adequate private retirement system for the growing American
work force.' It substantially supercedes prior legislation and con-
tains comprehensive funding" and vesting requirements,I prudent
investment standards 2 and stringent guidelines for the adoption
and administration of a private pension plan." To promote unified
regulation of the private pension area, ERISA establishes broad
federal jurisdiction for administration of its provisions with a con-
current general preemption of state law in this area."4 Much of
H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, supra note 3, at 4641.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1381) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
I It has been suggested that Congress was motivated to enact ERISA in an
attempt to make business and government partners in providing for the retirement
needs of the public due to the declining stability of the Social Security system.
Dondanville, The Pension Reform Act: The Civil Liability View, 43 INS. COUNSEL
J. 556 (n.76) citing P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REvOLuTION: How PENSION FUNDED
SocLALsM CAME To A1mIcA.
10 ERISA §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1081-1086 (1974).
I ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053 (1974).
12 ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104 (1974).
13 ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-1031 (1974).
11 Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that, except for causes of action arising
prior to January 1, 1975, the ERISA provisions "supercede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29
U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (1974). Subsection (c) of section 514 provides that "[tihe term
state law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action
having the effect of law, of any State." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(c) (1974). This preemp-
tion does not invalidate state insurance, banking, or security regulations, however.
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1974). In interpreting these
preemption provisions, the courts have held that Congress intended "absolute
preemption of the field of employee benefit plans." Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp.
473, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Where state law is preempted and no specific federal statute is applicable,
courts are not powerless. It has been held that "Congress has invested the courts
with a duty to create law governing aspects of employee benefit plans not specifi-
cally regulated by ERISA." Wayne Chemical v. Columbus Agency Service Corp.,
426 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ind. 1977). This interpretation is supported by the
remarks of Senator Javits, speaking on behalf of the conference version of ERISA:
In view of Federal preemption, State laws compelling disclosure from
private welfare or pension plans, imposing fiduciary requirements on
such plans, imposing criminal penalties on failure to contribute to
plans-unless a criminal statute of general application-establishing
State termination insurance programs, et cetera, will be superseded. It
3
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ERISA is intricately interwoven and the statutory provisions are
augmented by regulations and interpretations promulgated by the
Department of Labor and the Treasury Department.'5
The highly technical nature of these extensive regulatory pro-
visions and the confusion and duplication generated by their joint
administration have hampered efforts at plan modification and
amendment which would bring existing plans into compliance
with the vesting, funding, and reporting requirements of the Act.
Indeed, many attorneys and plan advisors have found themselves
overwhelmed with the task of making the adjustments and revi-
sions necessary to meet the tax qualifications and substantive re-
quirements of ERISA. This preoccupation with technical compli-
ance has, therefore, caused the new civil" and criminal"7 liability
provisions of the Act to be largely overshadowed. These liability
provisions, however, have serious implications for all professionals,
especially attorneys, who service private pension plans. Since the
liability provisions are a rather recent development,,8 few civil ac-
tions have been litigated thus far under the sanctions. However,
with the value of private pension assets expected to grow to $225
billion by 1980,2 the number of civil liability suits and the cost of
professional malpractice insurance for the attorney who services
private pension plans could escalate very rapidly. Since an attor-
ney may act in any one of a number of capacities in connection
with a private pension plan, his or her liability under the various
is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed
by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under
private welfare and pension plans.
120 Cong. Rec. 15751 (daily ed. August 22, 1974), quoted in Wayne Chemical at
321-22.
"1 The Department of Labor and the Treasury Department were given overlap-
ping authority to enforce the provisions of ERISA and to issue interpretive pro-
nouncements regulating its administration. ERISA § 3004, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1204
(1974), prior to amendment by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, ERISA Reorganization Plan,
No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47713 (1978).
Is ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (1974).
17 ERISA § 501, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (1974).
,1 The liability provisions of ERISA enacted in 1974 are substantially different
from those under previous legislation. Compare ERISA §§ 501-502, 29 U.S.C.A. §§
1131-1132 (1974) with the Welfare and Pension Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-836, §§ 2-10, 72 Stat. 997 (1958).
" See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 33 and 83 for examples of
the considerations involved.
" S. REP. No. 93-383, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 119741 U.S. CODE &
AD. NEWS 4639, 4891.
[Vol. 82
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civil and criminal provisions of ERISA may vary accordingly. The
statutory duties and responsibilities imposed on an attorney acting
as a plan fiduciary, for example, differ substantially from those
required of an attorney acting as a party-in-interest or as an ad-
visor to a plan administrator. Thus, it is essential that the defini-
tional aspects of the statute be examined, as well as the rules and
regulations issued by the Department of Labor and the Treasury
Department as related to the specific positions that may be occu-
pied by an attorney servicing a private pension plan. The remain-
der of this note deals with liability exposure under the Act for
counsel to a private pension plan, with particular emphasis on the
advisor ofoa small plan with less than one hundred participants.2'
CIVIL AND CRiMINAL LABImrY UNDER ERISA
Part V of ERISA imposes certain civil and criminal sanctions
for violation of the Act's substantive requirements. Criminal pen-
alties consisting of up to $100,000 in fines for corporations and
imprisonment of up to one year or fines up to $5,000 for individuals
may be imposed for the willful violation of certain reporting and
disclosure requirements of ERISA. 22 These criminal penalties sup-
plement those imposed under the Labor Management Relations
Act.2 1 The civil sanctions of ERISA have even more potentially
pervasive application than do the criminal penalties. Section
502(a) (1),24 for example, provides that a plan participant or benefi-
ciary may file a civil suit against any administrator who refuses
to comply with a request for information which must be furnished
under the Act.23 The administrator may be personally liable in
such instances to the complaining party by way of a judgment for
up to $100 per day of noncompliance measured from the date of
the administrator's first refusal to supply the information. 2 In
addition, any participant or beneficiary may bring an action to
21 Most plans with less than one hundred participants are accorded certain
administrative exemptions, such as exemption from the requirements for an annual
audit. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-46 (1978).
ERISA § 501, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (1974).
23 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 664 (1976). See also H. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1280, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 5106.
24 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1) (1974).
21 Such information is required by ERISA §§ 101-109, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-
1029 (1974).
26 ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(c) (1974).
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recover accrued benefits or to enforce prescribed rights under a
plan.27 These parties may also seek a declaratory judgment to
clarify any disputed right to future benefits." An injunction may
be sought under the Act by any plan participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary to prevent transactions which would transgress the sub-
stantive proscriptions of ERISA.
2 9
In addition to the rights and powers vested in interested par-
ties, section 502 of the Act gives the Secretary of Labor broad
power to bring civil actions on behalf of plan participants and
beneficiaries.? This provision was necessary to counteract the in-
herent deficiencies in self-policing regulatory statutes that had
been experienced in prior legislation.3 ' It could be anticipated that
few participants or beneficiaries would have the resources to sus-
tain a civil action under ERISA provisions, especially in light of
the relative monetary amounts involved. In many instances the
cost of litigation could no doubt exceed the benefits sought to be
recovered. Thus, the representative authority of the Secretary of
Labor was intended to provide a viable means for the enforcement
of substantive private rights. A similar vehicle is found in section
502(g) which provides that in any civil action brought under
ERISA, the court may, at its discretion, allow reasonable attorney
fees and court costs as an element of the recovery." Thus, this
means of fully compensating the complaining party for the cost of
litigation can have a significant impact on the accessibility to the
courts of plan participants and beneficiaries, thereby increasing
the liability exposure of attorneys and other advisors servicing pen-
sion plans.
An interesting example of this proposition can be found in the
case of Feagan v. Lang where the trustees of a union pension plan
sued to recover $6.52 in delinquent contributions from an employer
who was subject to the union plan. The suit was motivated by the
fear that failure to enforce the employer's obligation could subject
the trustees to personal liability for breach of their fiduciary du-
ties. The court awarded the trustees a judgment for the $6.52 plus
17 ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1974).
n Id.
" ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3) (1974).
10 ERISA § 502(a)(2),(4),(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(2),(4),(6) (1974).
3, Supra note 6.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g) (1974).
416 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
[Vol. 82
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$200 in auditor's fees and $350 for counsel fees. Although the court
noted that ERISA normally contemplates amicable resolution of
cases such as Feagan, 4 the result certainly illustrates the signifi-
cant impact that recovery of attorney fees may have on the atti-
tude of a beneficiary or trustee toward litigation.
THE ATOR EY AS A FImcIARY
Perhaps one of the most significant provisions in the civil
liability section of ERISA is section 502(a)(2)5 which authorizes
participants and beneficiaries to file suit against a plan fiduciary
for the breach of any fiduciary obligation. The fiduciary is required
to make good any losses or restore any foregone profits which would
have resulted from the proper use of plan assets where the losses
or foregone profits arise from a breach of fiduciary obligation." The
statutory definition of a "fiduciary" is broad enough to encompass
most advisors who are associated with a private pension plan in
any significant capacity, 7 and the probability of meeting the
"fiduciary" criteria seems to proportionately increase with the
party's involvement in plan activities.3
ERISA provides that a person shall be considered a fiduciary
to a plan to the extent that he or she either: (a) exercises any
discretionary authority or control in the management or disposi-
tion of its assets; (b) renders investment advice or has authority
to render investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct
or indirect, with regard to property or funds of the plan; or (c) has
discretionary authority or responsibility in the administration of
the plan.39 Regulations issued by the Department of Labor con-
strict the statutory definition somewhat in that a party performing
purely ministerial duties within the framework of policies, inter-
pretations, rules and practices formulated by others is not consid-
ered a fiduciary."0 Such ministerial duties include the preparation
of reports required by governmental agencies and the determina-
"Id. at 54.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(2) (1974).
ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109 (1974).
- ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21)(A) (1974).
" This aspect of the Act will be developed in greater detail in subsequent
sections of the note. See text accompanying notes 39-77, infra.
39 ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21)(A) (1974).
40 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1975).
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tion of eligibility under predetermined guidelines.' Although the
attorney may incidentally perform some of these ministerial func-
tions, it is apparent that his normal professional advisory capacity
involves much more discretion and influence on the policies and
practices of the plan than was contemplated by this ministerial
exception. Any person meeting the statutory fiduciary criteria is
subject to certain duties imposed by the Act, the foremost of these
being the duty to discharge his or her obligations solely in the
interest of participants and beneficiaries.2 The fiduciary duty of
loyalty under ERISA has been compared, in some instances, to
that of a corporate director.43 The fiduciary must discharge his or
her obligations for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits for
participants and beneficiaries and defraying the reasonable cost of
plan administration." Unless it is otherwise not prudent to do so,
he or she must diversify the plan investments so as to minimize
the risk of substantial loss." Under the standard of performance-
provided by the Act, the fiduciary must use the "care, skill, prud-
ence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that
a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like charac-
ter and with like aims."'" It has been suggested that use of this
"like expertise" standard raises the expected conduct of the pru-
dent investor above that of a common law "reasonable man".
47
The question thus arises as to whether the attorney who
merely renders legal advice to a plan is considered a fiduciary
under the statute. According to interpretive bulletins issued by the
Department of Labor, the answer to this question is a qualified
"no"." In the absence of any assertion of authority or control over
the plan, attorneys, accountants, and other professionals will not
ordinarily be considered fiduciaries while performing only their
usual professional functions. 9 Whether or not there has been such
"Id.
42 ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1) (1974).
43 See Note, 88 HARv. L. REv. 960 (1975); See also Panel Discussion, Who Are
Fiduciaries? 31 Bus. LAWYER 15, 83-98 (1975).
" ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1974).
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1974).
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1974).
'7 See Little and Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to
Tread, 30 VND. L. Rxv. 1, 12-13 (1977); Note, 88 HARv. L. Ray., supra note 43, at
965.
4 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (1975).
," Id. The exception for the rendering of professional services does not apply
[Vol. 82
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an assertion of authority or control over the plan or its assets is
essentially a factual question to be determined on a case by case
basis. A critical distinction which must be made in any "control"
determination is whether the attorney or other advisor has merely
made recommendations to the appropriate parties for administra-
tion of the plan or whether, in essence, he or she has made the
policy decisions. The fine line between these two positions can
present acute problems for counsel to a small plan whose sponsor
has no background or interest in the ramifications of ERISA. The
employer may desire only the tax benefits of a qualified pension
plan,"5 preferring to leave the administrative details of the plan to
the attorney, the accountant, or any other advisor who is willing
to accept the task. Furthermore, in a small plan the employer may
have neither the manpower nor the inclination to handle the ad-
ministrative duties imposed by ERISA. The attorney could thus
be confronted with an attempted delegation of complex policy de-
cisions which should be made by the sponsoring employer. In this
situation, the attorney should make clear to the plan sponsor the
scope of his or her limited advisory capacity. 51
The sponsoring employer of a plan is clearly a fiduciary under
ERISA,2 as are a plan's trustees., It is also apparent from the
Act's fiduciary definitions that anyone who renders investment
advice to a plan for compensation will be considered a fiduciary.
5 4
Regulations issued by the Department of Labor and the Treasury
Department provide that a party will be deemed to have rendered
investment advice when: (a) the person renders advice as to the
value of securities or other plan assets or makes recommendations
as to the advisibility of investing in, or disposing of, securities or
other plan assets; and (b)the person either (i) directly or indirectly
has discretionary authority over the purchase or sale of plan assets
or securities; or (ii) renders advice on the value or viability of
investments on a regular basis with the mutual understanding that
such advice will serve as the primary basis for investment decisions
and that the advice will be rendered on an individualized basis
related to the plan's particular needs for investment strategy, port-
to services rendered by an investment advisor to a plan.
10 A "qualified" pension plan is one which meets the substantive provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code for deductibility of contributions made under the plan.
51 See text accompanying notes 64-65 for similar considerations.
5Z 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1975).
3 Id.
54 ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104 (1974); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1976).
9
Campbell: Attorney's Liabilities under ERISA
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
folio composition or asset diversification." The regulations thus
suggest that in the absence of discretionary authority, fiduciary
status attaches only where the advisor and the plan (i.e. the spon-
soring employer or the plan trustees) mutually agree on the estab-
lishment of an advisory relationship, either by way of an express
agreement or by one implied from the circumstances and predi-
cated on the regularity with which advice is to be rendered. 6 Thus
if an attorney merely renders a legal opinion as to the advisability
of an investment based upon his or her interpretation of the
"prudent investor" standard, the attorney would presumably be
acting in the normal scope of his or her professional capacity and
would not be subject to classification as a fiduciary." However, if
the attorney ventures beyond mere legal conclusions and gives
investment advice based upon market projections or other analyti-
cal considerations, he or she could be categorized as a fiduciary
rendering investment advice for consideration." In determining
whether an attorney has passed beyond acting merely in a legal
advisory capacity and has instead entered the realm of
"investment advisor," the courts may consider factors such as the
regularity of "investment counseling," the extent to which any
"advice" is relied upon, the nature of the attorney's expertise, the
extent to which the "advice" is disclosed to interested parties and
the relation between the investment counseling and the possibility
of harm to the plan. 9
- 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1) (1975).
5 Note the language: "Renders any advice. . . on a regular basis to the plan
pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement or understanding, written or other-
wise, between such person and the plan. . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(B) (1975).
Although there is some doubt about the effectiveness of a disclaimer by the
advisor of his or her investment advisory status, it has been suggested that a clear
written notice by the advisor, acknowledged by the plan, negating any element of
authority or assent contemplated by the regulations would be effective in avoiding
fiduciary status unless the actions of both parties were clearly inconsistent with the
written understanding. See Miller, Permanent Regulations and Exemptions Under
ERISA: Clarification or Confusion for Securities Firms? 4 SEC. REG. L. J. 306, 308
(1976); and GERARD & ScHRmER, SEcuRrms INVrSMNTS UNDER ERISA 65-114,
(N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Taxation (ERISA supp.), vol. 35 (1977)). Such notice clause
could easily be incorporated into any engagement agreement between an attorney
and a plan.
" See Panel Discussion, Wh% Are Fiduciaries?, supra note 43 at 83.98.
m Note, 30 VAND. L. Rav., supra note 47, at 4.
59 Address by William J. Kilberg, Nov. 21, 1974, reprinted in [1974] 3 PENS.
& PROFIT SHARING (P-H) 135,013.
[Vol. 82
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Sometimes an attorney may be asked to formulate changes in
the funding medium of a plan, to assist, for example, in a rollover
from a common fund to a trust, or to terminate a plan entirely.
Again the investment advisory status of an attorney handling the
termination or change in funding medium of a plan may turn on
his or her discretionary authority to purchase or sell plan assets or
securities. If the attorney is merely acting at the direction of the
fiduciary charged with administration of the plan, then the invest-
ment advisor-fiduciary status presumably would not attach. 0 In
addition, at least one case has suggested that merely acting as a
custodian of plan assets, as the attorney may be called upon to do
in a termination process, does not establish a fiduciary relationship
under the Act."' If, however, the attorney makes recommendations
as to the advisibility of investing in or disposing of securities or
other plan assets and has discretionary authority over such pur-
chase or disposition, he or she then meets the regulation require-
ments for status as an investment advisor and therefore is a fidu-
ciary if the advice is rendered for compensation.
In the ordinary operation of a plan, or in extraordinary situa-
tions such as a rollover or termination, retention of an investment
manager or stock broker, as is usually the case with a moderate to
large-sized plan, would decrease the possibility that a plan attor-
ney would be subject to liability as a fiduciary for the rendering of
investment advice. The danger increases, however, in a small plan
setting where the accumulation of assets might not support the
utilization of an independent investment manager. In a small plan,
the investment duties usually fall upon either the employer, the
trustees, or an investment committee. Some of the parties charged
with the investment obligations may not have a great deal of finan-
cial acumen and might seek the advice of counsel as to the opti-
mum investment medium. In dealing with a small plan guided by
11 GERARD & SCHREIBER, SECURITIES INVESTMENTS UNDER ERISA 71-73 (N.Y.U.
Inst. Fed. Taxation (ERISA Supp.), vol. 35 (1977)).
11 Hibernia Bank v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 411 F. Supp. 478
(N.D. Cal. 1976). In that case, the court held that a bank who held plan funds in a
regular account was not a fiduciary because it did not have the requisite discretion-
ary authority or control over the plan assets. The bank was permitted to pay money
out of the account, but only at the direction of a plan trustee. The court noted that
a custodian could be a fiduciary, but the inclusion of the term fiduciary in the
definition of a "party in interest" under Section 3(14) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. §
1002(14) (1974), does not enlarge the definition of a fiduciary under Section (3)(21),
29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21) (1974). Hibernia Bank at 490.
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inexperienced investors, counsel should recommend a reliable in-
vestment institution such as a bank, an insurance company or a
mutual fund that has competent representatives who will service
the plan's account."2 Such organizations usually provide counsel-
ing of such an account for a nominal management fee and can
assist in compiling data for the various reports required of the
plan.
3
Even though an attorney may not render "investment ad-
vice", he or she may nonetheless exert sufficient influence and
control over the administration of a plan to warrant the finding
that a fiduciary capacity exists. Questions and answers issued by
the Department of Labor to supplement section 3(21)(A) 4 of
ERISA point out that in disputes over the interpretation of plan
provisions regarding eligibility, any person who has final authority
to authorize or disallow benefit payments is a fiduciary under the
Act. 5 Use of the term "final authority" suggests that the attorney
may provide a legal opinion as to the interpretation of the plan
without being a fiduciary, but that he or she should specify that
the ultimate decision of affirming or denying the benefits in ques-
tion is that of the responsible party under the plan, or if none is so
designated, then the sponsoring employer. The same standard
applies to plan amendments and modifications; the attorney may
provide his or her legal opinions as to compliance or may draft
substitute provisions designed to comply with ERISA, but the ulti-
mate decision on the amendments must come from the sponsoring
employer. Even though as a practical matter the employer's exer-
cise of authority over a small plan may require little more than a
"rubber stamp" of approval, such mechanical approval may be
11 The recommendation of an investment institution does not appear to be
within the scope of activities contemplated by the definition of rendering
"investment advice". See text accompanying note 55 for what constitutes rendering
investment advice.
u The utilization of the investment organization for preparation of the various
reports which must be filed with governmental agencies can reduce the administra-
tive burden of the plan manager and produce efficiency savings for the plan. The
investment organization will compile most information needed for the various re-
ports in the ordinary course of business and transfer the information to other advis-
ors for preparation of the reports. Many small plans can utilize the computerized
facilities of insurance, trust, or mutual fund organizations and the management fee
charged for these services is often less than the cost of having the reports prepared
by another advisor such as the plan's accountant.
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21)(A) (1974).
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1975).
[Vol. 82
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crucial in a small plan situation where the attorney has a wide
degree of influence. In any situation involving discretion or policy
decisions affecting the plan, the attorney rendering advice should
document the final exercise of authority by the sponsoring em-
ployer or other responsible party. Such documentation might con-
sist of a letter affirming the role of each party in the decision-
making process or an authenticated summary of the meeting at
which the action was taken or authorized. Either document should
reflect the attorney's recommendations and the employer's adop-
tion of the suitable alternative. The use of these devices could
prove helpful in avoiding or negating subsequent claims that the
attorney exercised managerial authority in the adoption of policies
or practices governing the administration of the plan.
In some instances, an employer with a small plan may request
that the plan attorney serve as a member of the trustee committee
or as an individual trustee for the plan. The attorney should cau-
tiously consider such a request, since trustees are clearly fiduciar-
ies under ERISA.6 6 An important consideration in this situation is
the fact that in addition to his or her own liability, a trustee may
be liable for the actions of other trustees under the co-trustee pro-
visions of section 406 of the Act. 7 Indeed, where a majority of
trustees appears ready to take action which would clearly violate
provisions of ERISA, it becomes incumbent upon minority trustees
to take adequate and reasonable steps to prevent the transaction. 8
Such steps could include seeking an injunction under 502(a)(3)9
of the Act, publication of the vote on the issue, or notification of
the Department of Labor.7" Once the minority has knowledge that
imprudent action is being contemplated, mere resignation by any
of the minority trustees without any action to prevent the impru-
dent conduct of the majority is not enough to avoid liability for the
I' d.
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1105 (1974). The section provides that a fiduciary may be
liable for a breach of fiduciary responsibilities of another fiduciary if he knowingly
participates in an act or omission of another fiduciary which constitutes a breach
or if he has neglected his fiduciary duties in employing the second fiduciary. The
fiduciary may also be liable for knowledge of the breach by the second fiduciary
unless he has made reasonable efforts to remedy the breach.
"8 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (1975).
eg 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3) (1974). The section provides that any fiduciary can
bring civil action to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provisions of the
Act or of the terms of the plan.
-' 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (1974).
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majority's action.7' Similarly, the resignation of an individual trus-
tee in protest of a breach of fiduciary duty committed by a co-
trustee will generally be considered insufficient to discharge his or
her positive duty to make reasonable efforts to remedy the
breach.7" Thus, in order to avoid the personal liability imposed for
failure to take remedial measures, the attorney-trustee may be
forced, in his or her fiduciary capacity, to initiate legal proceedings
against his or her own clients who may be co-trustees, management
or plan participants. These possibilities should impose powerful
constraints on the willingness of attorneys to act as plan trustees.
The character, judgment and background of other proposed trus-
tees, whether any participants or beneficiaries will serve as trus-
tees, the financial stability of the sponsoring employer and the
coverage afforded such activities within the scope of his or her
malpractice insurance are factors an attorney should carefully
evaluate before accepting a position as a plan trustee.
73
Like the attorney-trustee, an attorney who serves on the board
of directors of a sponsoring employer faces fiduciary responsibili-
ties. ERISA anticipates that members of the board of directors of
plan-sponsoring employers will be fiduciaries to the extent that
they exercise discretion or control over the employee plan.74 The
board of directors may be responsible for the selection, retention
or replacement of plan fiduciaries, and, as such, it is vested with
the requisite amount of discretion to qualify the group as fiduciar-
ies.75 Since the responsibility of the board, however, is limited to
this function of selection, retention or replacement, fiduciary lia-
bility is thus limited proportionately. Nonetheless, the directors
must have acted prudently and exercised ordinary care in the
selection, retention or replacement process and there must be no
reason to doubt the competency, integrity or responsibility of the
parties selected. Under section 405(a) of the Act, failure to meet
these standards may expose the directors to liability for any breach
of fiduciary duties by the chosen subordinates. 6 Furthermore, the
directors must review, at reasonable intervals, the performance of
trustees or other fiduciaries to ensure that their performance has
It Id.
n Id.
11 R. BILDEMSEE, PENSION REGULATION MANUAL, Vol. I § 20.7.4 at 338 (Rev. ed.
1978).
74 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1975).
75 Id.
74 29 U.S.C.A. § 1105(a) (1974).
[Vol. 82
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been in compliance with ERISA and the terms of the plan and that
their actions have substantially met the needs of the plan.7 No
exact formula is given for this review process but the procedure
must reasonably assure a fair evaluation of performance based
upon the nature and organization of the plan and its funding
scheme.
In the event that a plan attorney meets the fiduciary criteria
and thus is subjected to the previously outlined loyalty con-
straints,78 a serious conflict of interest may arise if the employer is
sued by a plan participant or beneficiary. While the employer may
have initially retained the attorney in anticipation of the possibil-
ity of such litigation, the attorney's status as a fiduciary to the plan
may preclude him or her from defending the employer. Section
406(b) (2)7" of ERISA provides that a fiduciary shall not, with re-
gard to the plan, act in his individual or other capacity on behalf
of a party whose interests are adverse to those of the plan or its
participants or beneficiaries. The intent of this provision is to pre-
vent "a fiduciary from being put in a position where he has dual
loyalties, and, therefore he cannot act exclusively for the benefit
of a plan's participants and beneficiaries."80 A possible resolution
of this dilemma may be arguably found in section 408(c)(3)1 which
provides that the loyalty constraints of section 406 do not prohibit
a fiduciary from serving as an officer, employee, agent or represent-
ative of a party-in-interest while also serving as a fiduciary. This
exception, however, appears to be for the limited purpose of allow-
ing owner-employees to serve as fiduciaries and as such would have
a minimal impact on the prohibitions of section 406.82
The two provisions were considered in Curren v. Freitag,l a
case involving a collectively-bargained union pension fund. In this
case, a pension fund was established by a trust agreement which
required sixteen trustees: eight appointed by the employee's union
and eight appointed by two employers' associations. The plaintiffs,
trustees appointed by the employers, brought suit alleging defects
in the structure and operation of the fund and sought to hold the
- 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1975).
71 See text accompanying notes 42-46.
, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106(b)(2) (1974).
H. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, supra note 23 at 5089.
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(c)(3) (1974).
82 H. CONF. RFz. No. 93-1280, supra note 23 at 5092.
432 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. IMl. 1977).
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trustees representing the union personally liable under ERISA fi-
duciary provisions. The defendants counterclaimed against the
employer trustees collectively for breach of fiduciary duties to the
fund in instigating the lawsuit and against the plaintiff trustee
Curren individually for violating ERISA section 406(b)(2) by ac-
tively representing certain contractors who refused to make re-
quired contributions under the plan. The counterclaim more spe-
cifically asserted that Curren counseled two employers to resist
audits ordered by the fund and to refuse payment demands by the
fund because, in his opinion, the audits and subsequent lawsuits
were not properly authorized by the fund trustees. Curren re-
sponded that he had given his opinion that the audits and lawsuits
were improperly authorized, but that such opinion was given in the
course of his duties as director of labor relations of the employers'
associations and that his activities in that capacity did not violate
his fiduciary duties to the fund.
Citing section 408 of ERISA as the controlling authority, the
court rejected the allegations that Curren's actions on behalf of the
employers' associations were "at total war" with his obligations as
a trustee of the fund. The opinion noted that since section 408
allowed Curren to act in both capacities, it would be illogical to
require him to forego the rendering of advice and assistance that
he would have been expected to give to the employers' associations
had he not been a trustee of the fund. The court then specifically
addressed the question of
whether counseling parties to resist audits and to refuse pay-
ment to the Fund, suggesting of specific legal counsel to them,
participating in meetings concerning their legal defense and
issuing a 'bulletin' advising adverse parties of an allegedly im-
proper collection effort, constitutes acting on behalf of an ad-
verse party in any transaction involving the plan within the
meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2)."
The court held that to give the section the broad reading urged by
the counterclaimants would require a fiduciary who also serves as
an employee of a party-in-interest to neither inform nor counsel his
employer as to his opinion of the propriety of actions taken by the
fund. The court rejected the imposition of such a bifurcated stan-
dard upon the trustee and stated that a workable construction of
the two statutory provisions "would prevent the fiduciary from
" Id. at 672.
[Vol. 82
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being placed in a position where he was dealing with the Fund on
behalf of his employer in a matter concerning the assets of the
Fund." 5 "Dealing" was defined as meaning the fiduciary had
the power to compromise the positions of the employer, the plan
or both. The court emphasized that the critical distinction was
between advocating a course of action or a solution and actually
having the power to adopt that course of action or implement the
solution. This interpretation would prohibit a fiduciary who is
serving dual roles from holding a position which authorizes him to
accept on behalf of the plan, a compromised settlement of less than
the amount properly due the plan, but would not prohibit the
fiduciary from advising his employer that the plan might accept
such a reduced amount. The court held that Curren's actions were
in a general sense adverse to the interests of the beneficiaries of the
fund, since his advice of refusing payment would result in in-
creased collection costs to the pension fund. However, the court
held that the actions at best could be characterized as giving aid
and comfort to an adverse party but they did not constitute acting
on behalf of an adverse party within the meaning of section
406(b) (2).16 The decision typifies the difficulties encountered when
the dual roles of advisor and fiduciary are intertwined. Although
the court held that Curren had not breached his fiduciary duties,
it is possible that his dual involvement would have been more
closely scrutinized if he had been an attorney directing the legal
action.
The concept of the pension plan as a separate entity under
ERISA may be difficult for some attorneys to accept since they
formerly provided advice for a plan as a consequence of their serv-
ices for the employer. 7 The Curren decision suggests, however,
that the safest, most practical course for the attorney is the utiliza-
tion of a separate employment arrangement with the pension plan,
or at least the inclusion of some provision in the plan for retention
of separate counsel in the event a conflict like that in Curren
should arise. From a purely pragmatic approach, any litigation
between a plan and its sponsoring employer would require the
application of normal professional standards regarding conflict of
interest, and as such the plan would require separate legal repre-
sentation."
93 Id.
91 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106(b)(2) (1974).
' Panel Discussion, Who Are Fiduciaries?, supra note 43, at 83-94.
See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs No. 5. For a comment on the han-
17
Campbell: Attorney's Liabilities under ERISA
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
THE ATTORNEY AS A PARTY-IN-INTEREST
As contrasted with the factual inquiries necessary to apply the
fiduciary provisions of ERISA, counsel to a private pension plan
is clearly designated as a party-in-interest under the Act." Section
406" imposes limitations on any transactions between a plan and
a party-in-interest which would constitute the sale, exchange or
leasing of any property; the extension of credit; or the furnishing
of goods, services or facilities." The section also prohibits any
transfer to, or the use of, plan assets by a party-in-interest.2 While
some of the restrictions imposed by section 406 are relaxed by
specific exemptions," the limitations are otherwise to be strictly
administered,"4 and failure to observe them could subject a party-
in-interest to a civil penalty imposed by the Secretary of Labor of
up to 100% of the amount involved in the prohibited transaction."
The section 406 prohibited transaction rules seem to preclude
an attorney from providing services to a plan for a fee. Section
408(b)(2), however, contains an express exemption from the sec-
tion 406 prohibitions so that a plan may contract with a party-in-
interest for legal, accounting, or other services necessary for the
operation and administration of the plan." The exemption is lim-
ited, however, to only reasonable compensation for such services
as are rendered."7 Thus, an attorney who provides services for a
plan and charges excessive fees for such services has technically
entered into a prohibited transaction to the extent that his fees
exceed reasonable compensation. Such an event might also justify
the termination of the employment agreement between the plan
and the attorney."
It is important to note also that the exemption of section 408
applies only to services that are both reasonable and necessary.
dling of potential conflicts in non-litigating counseling, see Morgan, The Evolving
Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. REv. 702, 727-28 (1977).
" ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003 (1974).
0 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106 (1974).
91 Id.
92 Id.
13 See ERISA § 408, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108 (1974).
"1 ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(a) (1974).
"5 ERISA § 502(i), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(i) (1974).
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(b)(2) (1975).
'Id.
" H. CONF. REP- No. 93-1280, supra note 23, at 5092.
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Services rendered by counsel who is receiving full time pay from
an employer, except for reimbursement of expenses properly and
actually incurred and not otherwise reimbursed, are not covered. 9
Thus, if a compensation agreement is based upon salary, a lawyer
could not recover fees for litigation as an element of an award. The
purpose of this rule is to prevent double payment for services. 09 In
Huge v. Old Home Manor, Inc.,"0 a case involving issues similar
to those in the Feagan case,"0 2 the trustees of the United Mine
Workers (UMW) pension plan brought an action to compel the
defendant coal operator to make timely royalty payments to the
UMW pension fund. The court held that the defendant had paid
the royalties due the plan but such payments were consistently
late and therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to interest on the late
payments at a rate of 6% per annum for a period of 18 months, in
the amount of $6,430.71. In addition to the interest, the court
awarded the plaintiffs court costs of $195.53 and fees of outside
counsel in the amount of $2,218.111 The court, however, refused
to award $750 claimed by plaintiff as fees for house counsel due to
counsel's salaried employment by the UMW fund. The court also
disallowed an award of $1,304, requested by plaintiff as costs of an
audit conducted by the fund. The court rejected the claim because
the auditor was employed by the fund and the fund customarily
bore the expense of periodic audits. The court did allow an award
of $426 to cover the travel expenses of house counsel.
Thus, as demonstrated in Huge, an attorney contemplating an
employment contract with a pension plan should take steps to
safeguard against the party-in-interest pitfalls. Since the compen-
sation arrangement could be subject to judicial review for reason-
ableness, the attorney should document the amount of time ex-
pended and the nature of the services rendered to the plan. Should
the underlying nature of the service agreement be challenged the
attorney must also be prepared to justify the necessity of any serv-
ices rendered. Furthermore, since under section 408 a plan may
terminate a service agreement under circumstances disadvanta-
geous to the plan, the agreement should address the issues of no-
99 Id.
' ERISA § 408(c)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(c)(2) (1974).
,01 419 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
102 Supra, note 33.
"I Recall that the statute provides for reasonable compensation. See text ac-
companying note 97, infra.
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tice, contingencies, and the conditions under which such a termi-
nation would be effective.
The prohibitions of section 408 which preclude a party-in-
interest from purchasing property or securities of a plan or borrow-
ing money therefrom' 4 are another major concern for an attorney
advising a plan and the sponsoring employer on transactions con-
ducted between them.' 5 Small employers, for example, may look
at employee pension plans as a source of funds to meet temporary
cash shortages. They may also view their required payments to the
plan as an obligation that can be postponed in order to relieve an
impending cash squeeze. Loans from the plan to the sponsoring
employer, however, are prohibited unless they come under one of
the exemptions of section 408(b).'' Since the above circumstances
would not fall within these exemptions, such transactions would
be prohibited, and their consummation could subject the employer
to civil penalties,'0 7 as well as constitute a breach of fiduciary du-
ties by the trustees of the plan.' The temptations for the small
employer to utilize pension funds to meet business exigencies dur-
ing periods of economic crisis could be immense, yet under these
circumstance§, the attorney must stress the necessity of maintain-
ing the segregation and integrity of the pension funds and the
consequences of participating in a prohibited transaction.
The limitations imposed on employer-plan transactions raise
an interesting question under the fiduciary standards of ERISA as
"I ERISA § 406(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106(a)(1) (1974).
,03 See ERISA § 407, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107 (1974). There are limitations imposed
on the amount of a sponsoring employer's securities that may be held by the pen-
sion plan, and the restrictions also apply to the securities of affiliates of the em-
ployer.
IN 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(b) (1974). This section provides in part:
(b) The prohibitions provided in section 406 shall not apply to any of the
following transactions:
(1) Any loans made by the plan to parties in interest who are
participants or beneficiaries of the plan if such loans (A) are avail-
able to all such participants and beneficiaries on a reasonably
equivalent basis, (B) are not made available to highly compen-
sated employees, officers, or shareholders in an amount greater
than the amount made available to other employees, (C) are made
in accordance with specific provisions regarding such loans set
forth in the plan, (D) bear a reasonable rate of interest, and (E)
are adequately secured.
'11 Infra, text accompanying notes 24-30 and 36.
1' Infra, text accompanying notes 36 and 42-46.
[Vol. 82
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to whether a plan, by its trustees, can compromise amounts due
the plan by a sponsoring employer. The question becomes very
important for the plan attorney conducting litigation against an
employer for past due contributions. Although there has been no
clear judicial pronouncement on this question, the cases"0 9 suggest
that trustees of a plan should be extremely cautious in settling
claims against sponsoring employers for less than the full amount
due. It has been suggested that the fiduciaries should be guided by
the prudent man standard in weighing any compromise and that
prudent persons do compromise their positions in appropriate cir-
cumstances."' In situations where the advantages and disadvan-
tages of a suit are relatively even, the appropriateness of a compro-
mise might be offset by the availability of court costs and attor-
ney's fees as an element of recovery and thus compel litigation to
enforce collection of past due payments."'
ADVISING THE PLAN ADMINISTRATOR
Under ERISA, every plan must have an administrator who is
responsible for meeting certain disclosure and reporting require-
ments."2 Where the administrator is not designated by the opera-
tive plan instrument, the plan sponsor assumes the role. In the
case of a plan established by a single enterprise, the plan sponsor
is the employer. If a plan is established by more than one em-
ployer, the sponsor could be an employee organization, such as a
union, or an employers' association. A plan administrator may or
may not be a fiduciary depending upon the extent of his or her
vested discretionary authority, but he or she would probably at
least be a party-in-interest. These designations, however, are inde-
pendent of the various reporting and disclosure responsibilities
imposed by the Act.
The plan administrator is required to furnish each plan partic-
WI Curren v. Freitag, 432 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Ill. 1977); Eaves v. Penn, 426 F.
Supp. 830 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Feagan v. Lang, 416 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
10 Feagan v. Lang, 416 F. Supp. 53, 54 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
"I Id.
HI See ERISA § 101(a),(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1021(a),(b) (1974). The committee
report on ERISA suggests that the restrictive nature of the exemption was to pro-
mote arrangements which would allow a plan to terminate services on reasonably
short notice so that a plan would not become locked into an arrangement that might
become disadvantageous. The exemption also anticipates that the compensation
arrangement will allow for modification, such that the plan will not be bound to a
disadvantageous price.
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ipant with certain statements and reports including summary plan
descriptions, summary annual reports, and reports of the partici-
pants' benefit rights."3 In addition, the administrator must file
informational reports with the Secretary of Labor and the Treasury
Department."' Failure to abide by these requirements could sub-
ject the administrator to criminal sanctions of fines and/or impris-
onment for wilful violation of the disclosure provisions or to civil
liability in a suit by a participant or beneficiary who has requested
certain information and been refused without just cause."' A
plan's attorney, accountant, actuary and other advisors play im-
portant roles in assisting the administrator in the preparation of
required reports. A summary plan description which includes an
explanation of the plan's eligibility, disqualification, vesting and
funding provisions, as well as the procedures for presenting claims
for benefits and the remedies under the plan for the denial of such
claims must be provided to all plan participants and beneficiar-
ies."' Furthermore, the description must be "written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and
shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably
apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obli-
gations under the plan.""' 7 Considering the highly technical vesting
and eligibility provisions contained in some plans, this standard is
often difficult to meet, and the plan attorney is often in the best
position to provide interpretation of the various plan provisions for
the administrator.
The disclosure and reporting requirements become especially
burdensome for a small plan administrator. In preparing the re-
quired reports for the Department of Labor, the Treasury Depart-
ment and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,"8 along with
statements for the plan participants and beneficiaries, the ad-
ministrator of a small plan can easily be overwhelmed with paper-
work. An employer may not have the manpower to permit one
",3 ERISA § 101(a),(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1021(a),(b) (1974).
Id.
,, See text accompanying notes 22 and 24-26, supra.
", ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1022(a)(1) (1974).
117 Id.
,,M The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation was established by the Act to
protect plan participants and beneficiaries from loss of pension benefits upon the
failure or termination of the plan or of the sponsoring employer's enterprise. The
Corporation is funded by contributions required of defined benefit plans under
ERISA; the contribution is based upon a rate per participant in the plan.
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employee to devote full time efforts to the duties of administering
the plan, and consequently the administrator of a small plan is
frequently a management employee who has many other responsi-
bilities. In this situation, much of the report preparation is dele-
gated to an advisory team consisting of the plan attorney, an ac-
countant, and a representative of an investment institution, such
as an insurance agent, bank trust officer, or mutual fund advisor.
The costs of such professional services can make administration of
a small plan financially prohibitive unless the functions of each
advisor are coordinated to eliminate any duplication of informa-
tion or delay in report preparation. Toward this end, the plan
attorney should meet with the plan's administrator, accountant,
and other advisors to delegate various functions, to set a timetable
for the preparation of various reports, to exchange information
which might be required of the other advisors in performing their
tasks and to discuss any additional problems which might be en-
countered. In addition to saving money for the plan or the plan
sponsor, such coordination will also promote more accurate reports
and statements, while at the same time allowing the plan adminis-
trator to discharge his duties more efficiently.
An important question arising from the delegation of the re-
port preparation duties is the extent to which the responsibility for
false statements or concealed facts is transferred to the advisor
who prepares the reports. Decisions under the Welfare and Pension
Plan Disclosure Act"' reject the contention that an administrator
may transfer his responsibility for accurate reporting, and al-
though the Disclosure Act has been superceded by ERISA, the
nature of the reporting duties under the two statutes is similar.'20
It was held in United States v. Santiago,'2 that an administrator
could not transfer the responsibility for substantial understate-
ments of contributions by employees to the accountant who pre-
pared certain disclosure reports since the accountant was not hired
to conduct an audit or to verify the accuracy of financial informa-
tion supplied to him.' In United States v. Talkow, "I an adminis-
"I Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed by ERISA 29 U.S.C.A. §§
1001-1381 (1974).
,1 Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1027 (1974) with the original version at Pub. L. No.
87-420, § 17(c), (1962), 76 Stat. 42.
121 528 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1976) cert. denied 425 U.S. 1972 (1976).
'1 Note that under section 103 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1023, an audit con-
ducted by a public accountant is required in some instances.
1- 532 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1976).
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trator was convicted for his deliberate failure to disclose certain
party-in-interest loans in the fund's annual financial reports. The
administrator stated that he had not read the reports and that the
fund's accountant was responsible for their preparation. The court
nevertheless held that the signature of the administrator on the
report was prima facie proof of his knowledge of the contents and
that he was precluded from relying upon the accountant's prepara-
tion of the reports to insulate himself from liability. The court
noted that the defendant had failed to disclose his interest in cer-
tain corporations to which the fund had made loans and that an
assertion of reliance upon an accountant's work is never a defense
to fraudulent nondisclosure where the defendant has not disclosed
all of the material facts to the accountant.
These cases suggest two important points for the attorney who
is advising a plan administrator. First, the attorney's responsibil-
ity for the contents of any report prepared by him or her for the
administrator will usually be limited by the veracity of the infor-
mation supplied by the administrator. Knowledge of facts or cir-
cumstances obtained from incidental sources during the rendering
of regular services to the plan, however, might provide a possible
exception to this axiom. If, for example, the attorney learns of
party-in-interest transactions while assimilating financial data for
inclusion in the annual reports, he or she should confront the ap-
propriate party with the information and seek to include such
information in the reports if it could have a material impact upon
the interpretation and evaluation of the reports. Secondly, the
attorney should advise the plan administrator of the duty to exam-
ine and verify the contents of the various reports required by
ERISA. The administrator should be fully apprised that his or her
signature on the reports and statements establish a prima facie
case of knowledge of the contents. It is important, therefore, that
procedures be developed to verify the accuracy and completeness
of data comprising the reports. The cooperation of the various
advisors in compiling information and the adoption of procedures
which include some form of cross-checking and collaboration will
help eliminate needless mistakes which could result in costly liti-
gation.2 14
"24 A system of cross-checking can be developed by utilizing the interrelated
nature of the various advisors' duties. The plan attorney should develop a plan
synopsis summarizing all of the significant plan aspects reflecting amendments if
any. The plan synopsis should be provided to the accountant or other advisor who
[Vol. 82
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The expanded liability and reporting burdens imposed by
ERISA have caused a number of plan sponsors to re-evaluate the
benefits of sponsoring an employee pension plan. Furthermore,
nondiscrimination provisions,' which require the admission of
more employees and promote equal participation opportunities for
non-management workers, have greatly increased the cost of main-
taining a plan. Funding and vesting requirements'26 have created
is charged with the duty of preparing the annual reports to be filed with the'Depart-
ment of Labor and the IRS. The attorney may want to review with the plan sponsor
any information about participation, vesting, and funding. The periodic review of
the actual operation of these provisions as reflected by the information contained
in the reports will enable the attorney to keep abreast of fluctuations in the plan
which could make modification necessary. The financial information contained in
the report should be verified by a second source if possible. An example of this
process would be checking financial information supplied to the report preparer by
the plan sponsor against a funds statement supplied by the custodian of the plan
assets. Many of the verification functions can be delegated among the advisory
team and the attorney may serve as a co-ordinator of the functions to promote a
complete and thorough presentation of information.
One area of particular concern in the preparation of the reports involves ex-
tracting information from the plan sponsor. Often the plan sponsor may be unaware
of his duty to report certain transactions or the prohibitions against them. The
problem is basically one of discovery and the use of a questionnaire may tend to
alleviate the difficulties. The questionnaire should be relatively simple and should
address the types of transactions that the attorney is concerned with (i.e. are any
payments or contributions due from the sponsor under the plan past due?). The
questionnaire can be developed in cooperation with other advisors who take part
in preparing the reports. It can serve as a valuable tool in preventing the types of
nondisclosures exhibited in the Santiago and Tolkow cases discussed above.
', ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1052 (1974).
2 The funding provisions are found in ERISA §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C.A. §§
1081-1086 (1974). The vesting requirements are found in ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1053 (1974). The funding provisions generally require that the plan sponsor con-
tribute the amount necessary to cover the present cost of providing future benefits
and an amount to amortize any unfunded past service that will be considered in
computing future benefits. Normally the calculation of the amount to be funded
requires an actuarial calculation based upon the ages of the participants, the re-
spective anticipated retirement dates, mortality projections, investment return and
other factors. Usually the only types of plans which involve an annual funding
requirement are those which provide a determinable benefit amount that can be
projected at any point in time. Such plans are usually designated as "defined
benefit plans". This type of plan may be contrasted with a profit sharing plan where
the sponsor makes contributions according to a formula based upon the sponsor's
profit level. Since future profits can not be predicted with any degree of certainty,
the individual participants' future benefit rights can not be computed and generally
profit sharing plans are not subject to the funding standards.
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cash flow difficulties in some instances, and the cost of administra-
tion under the various reporting and disclosure requirements of
ERISA have increased so rapidly as to make continuation of some
plans financially prohibitive. The cumulative result bf these fac-
tors has been the termination of some 14,000 plans since the enact-
ment of ERISA.'1 Additionally, more sponsors are looking for al-
ternative means of providing employee plans without incurring the
burdens of ERISA.
Enactment of the Revenue Act of 1978,1' created one such
alternative with its "Simplified Employee Pension" provisions.'"
Beginning in 1979, employers will be allowed to provide retirement
benefits through contributions to employees' Individual Retire-
ment Accounts (IRA's) instead of maintaining a qualified em-
ployee pension plan.3 The use of individual IRA's is not subject
to ERISA since the "plan" is maintained by the individual em-
ployees rather than the employer. The employer is merely required
to make contributions under a definite written allocation for-
' Turpin, Trust Industry Update-New Legislative Developments, 116 TM. &
EsT. 244, 246 (1977).
I" Pub. L. No. 95-600 (1978).
"2 Revenue Act of 1978 § 152 (1978); Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 408(j-1)
as amended.
110 Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA's) were authorized by ERISA as a
means for providing employees who were not covered by an employer-maintained
plan a chance to establish their own individual retirement program. The Internal
Revenue Code § 408 defines an IRA as "a trust created or organized in the United
States for the exclusive benefit of an individual or his beneficiaries. . . ." I.R.C. §
408(a). Under the new simplified IRA provisions each employee establishes his or
her own IRA which is governed by IRA rules as to distributions, withdrawals, and
other activities. I.R.C. § 408(a)(1-6); 408(d)(4); 408(e),(f),(h),(i). Employers can
make direct contributions to the employee's IRA and the contributions are deducti-
ble by the employer as a salary expense and includible in the employee's income.
See S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 91, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6854. The employee is then granted an offsetting deduction for
the employer's contributions up to the lesser of $7,500 or 15% of earned income.
I.R.C. § 219. The employee may make his or her own contributions to the IRA
account which are still subject to the regular IRA limitations of 15% of earned
income or $1,500. I.R.C. § 408(a)(1), 4080). If an employer's contributions to the
IRA equal or exceed the regular IRA $1,500 or 15% ceiling, the employee cannot
make any contributions for the tax year, even if the employer's contributions do
not reach the 15% or $7,500 deductible limit for employer contributions. If, how.
ever, employer contributions are less than the regular IRA deduction limits (15%
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mula.'3' The new simplified pension plans also provide greater flex-
ibility for employers. Under a simplified plan, the employer makes
contributions to the employees' IRA's at his discretion. Contribu-
tions can thus be suspended or reduced from year to year, giving
the employer more control over the financial conditions under
which pension funds are provided. Additionally, under the simpli-
fied plan, the employee maintains and controls the administration
of his individual pension. The self-policing policy sought in ERISA
and previous legislation is thus achieved.'32 The simplified pension
plan represents a viable alternative for the small employer who
maintains a relatively small work force and who cannot afford the
headaches and financial burdens imposed by ERISA.
CONCLUSION
ERISA represents the product of ten years of consideration,
contemplation and debate over the need for federal regulation of
private pension plans. Although it provides many reforms which
strengthen the overall system, the Act has been an administrative
nightmare. Much of the confusion and frustration created by am-
biguous regulations and duplicated reporting requirements stems
from the dual administrative responsibilities delegated to the De-
partment of Labor and the Treasury Department. President
Carter responded to criticism of this dual jurisdiction by adopt-
ing the ERISA Reorganization Plan' which provides for segre-
gation of the responsibilities between the departments. The plan
contemplates simplification of the reporting requirements and
reformation of the reporting standards to ease the paperwork
crunch encountered by many plan managers.
"I The requirements which an employee must satisfy to share in the allocation
and the manner in which the amount allocated is to be computed (i.e. what basis
will be used for the allocation) must be spelled out in a definite allocation formula.
The formula must provide nondiscrimatory contributions for each employee over
age 25 who has performed services for the employer during any part of three out of
the five preceding calendar years, and cannot discriminate in favor of an employee
who is an officer, shareholder, or a highly compensated individual. The new provi-
sions also require that employers who make contributions to a simplified plan must
file such reports as the Secretary of the Treasury may require by regulation. I.R.C.
§ 408(k),(l). The Committee Report on the legislation notes, however, that such
requirements are anticipated to be minimal. S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 91, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6854.
3I See text accompanying note 31, supra.
Im ERISA Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47713 (1978).
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The reorganization plan, however, is only of an interim nature,
and further modifications of ERISA could be forthcoming amid
angry complaints and plan terminations. Until such modifications
are implemented, however, ERISA can represent a dangerous trap
for unwary plan-sponsoring employers and advising attorneys. A
thorough examination of the Act's provisions and well developed
plan documents and articles are therefore essential to protect both
employer and advisor alike from the liability hazards of ERISA.
David L. Campbell
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